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WHAT COURTS CAN DO IN THE FACE OF 
THE NEVER-ENDING ASBESTOS CRISIS 
Paul F. Rothstein* 
For more than twenty-five years, state and federal courts 
across the country have struggled to respond to an ever-
expanding asbestos litigation crisis. 1 Over $20 billion and 
thirty bankruptcies later, more asbestos claims are filed now 
than ever before. 2 Many predict that the number of claims 
(and the number of bankruptcies) will only keep increasing 
and that tens of billions of additional dollars will be spent.3 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Rothstein is 
author of Evidence: Cases, Materials and Problems, Evidence in a Nutshell: State 
and Federal Rules of Evidence and several other books as well as over 100 
articles. The preparation of this article was made possible by funding from the 
Coalition for Asbestos Justice, Inc. 
'One of the first major asbestos-liability cases was Borel v. Fibreboard Corp., 
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), where the court of appeals affirmed a verdict 
against an asbestos defendant on a strict liability theory. 
2 See Harold Brubaker, Three Major Firms Have Filed for Bankruptcy 
Protection from Asbestos Claims, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 2001 (describing the 
history of Crown Cork & Seal which, for three months in the early 1960s, owned 
a company that made one product that allegedly contained asbestos and still 
spent $90 million on asbestos claims in 2000 alone); John Rooney, Evolution, Not 
End, Seen for Asbestos Litigation, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 21, 2001; A Trail of 
Toxic Torts: Fresh Asbestos Trouble for Insurers, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 7317425. 
3 See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act: Hearing on H.R. 1283 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congo (1999) [hereinafter 
Hearings) (statement of Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School); 
Christopher Bowe, The Americas: Asbestos Sparks New Jitters in US Litigation, 
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001; Queena Sook Kim, Asbestos Claims Continue to Mount, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2853509; Richard B. 
Schmitt, How Plaintiffs' Lawyers Have Turned Asbestos into a Court Perennial, 
WALL ST. J., March 5, 2001, at A-I, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2856111. A.M. 
Best Co. recently estimated that asbestos claims could ultimately cost the 
insurance industry $65 billion. Lorraine Gorski, Asbestos Claims Surge Set to 
Dampen Earnings for Commercial Insurers, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2001. Additional 
billions of dollars would be incurred by defendants themselves. A recent study by 
1 
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Despite the lengthy history of asbestos litigation, our 
courts have not been able to develop a coordinated, 
comprehensive and fair method to resolve the asbestos 
problem. Judges, in an effort to clear their dockets, have often 
adopted case management techniques that have actually 
encouraged more and more asbestos claims, particularly by 
claimants who are, at best, mildly impaired or more recently, 
not sick at all.4 As a result, plaintiffs with no physical 
impairment receive windfall settlements that reduce the 
amount of funds available to pay the claims of those who are 
truly sick or who may become truly sick. At the same time, 
many of these case management techniques have limited the 
procedural protections typically available to tort defendants. 
Without a fair and rational method of resolving asbestos 
claims in the tort system, and with federal legislation 
remaining highly speculative, defendants have increasingly 
been forced into bankruptcy courts.5 That outcome benefits no 
one. Plaintiffs suffer because the limited pool of funds 
available to pay asbestos claims is "steadily being depleted,»6 
making it more likely that claimants who develop a serious 
asbestos-related illness will not receive adequate or timely 
compensation in the future. 7 Bankrupt companies may have 
to layoff employees, close plants and cut back on core 
business practices-matters which can be significant to the 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin estimates that the ultimate cost will reach $200 billion, 
of which 39% will be borne by defendants and 61% by U.S. or foreign insurers. 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Estimates Claims Associated with U.S. Asbestos Exposure 
Will Ultimately Cost $200 Billion, Bus. WIRE, June 12, 2001 [hereinafter 
Tillinghast-Towers). 
• The Asbestos Blob, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2001, at A-14, available at 2001 
WL-WSJ 2868353. 
6 Since the beginning of 2000, seven major asbestos defendants, including 
U.S. Gypsum in June 2001, have filed for bankruptcy. See Daniel Gross, Recovery 
Lessons from an Industrial Phoenix, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at Bus. 4; Sabrina 
Jones, It's Been 38 Years Since W.R . ... , WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2001, at E-1 
(discussing the claims against W.R. Grace which filed for bankruptcy shortly after 
the article was published), available at 2001 WL 2552120. 
6 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000). 
7 See Queena Sook Kim, Firms Hit by Asbestos Litigation Take Bankruptcy 
Route, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2000, at B4, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26620724; 
Mark D. Plevin et aI., Don't Bankrupt Asbestos, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001, at 
68. 
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local or national economy.s And, in consequence,. some other 
good, safe, even beneficial, non-asbestos products may no 
longer become available, either because of the financial 
problems of the company or because the company or other 
companies, perhaps unreasonably, fear liability. Bankruptcies 
are also bad news for remaining defendants that have only a 
remote connection to asbestos such as oil companies, hospitals, 
colleges and many local "mom and pop" small businesses.9 
Plaintiffs seek compensation from these peripheral defendants 
to make up for the loss of funds from larger, more culpable 
companies that have gone into bankruptcy.lO This has a 
domino effect that results in additional defendants filing for 
bankruptcy. 11 
• Financial problems are of course faced by companies that have not filed for 
bankruptcy protection. "Every company that is a defendant in asbestos litigation" 
sees these lawsuits "sop up cash flow, diverting money that could be used to 
develop new products, hire new employees, and build new plants." Brubaker, 
supra note 2. The stock values of these companies plummet because "Wall Street 
loathes the uncertainty of a liability that seems to have no end." Id.; see also The 
People v. America Inc.: American Companies in Court, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 
2001 (discussing the fmancial scrutiny being faced by companies with even the 
most remote connection to asbestos claims), available at 2001 WL 7318244. 
9 Deepa Babington, Lawyers Seek New Asbestos Targets After W.R. Grace, 
REUTERS, Apr. 2, 2001; Cy Goldberg & Darren Check, Bullseye Gets Bigger on 
Peripheral Defendants: The Effect of Bankruptcies on Asbestos Litigation, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 25, 2001; Adrian Michaels, Problem of Cash Reserves to Meet 
Rising Claims, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at 3. 
10 U.S. Gypsum filed for bankruptcy in June 2001 citing political changes in 
the U.S. Senate which it believed made asbestos legislation less likely. USG Says 
It May Seek Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at A-12, available 
at 2001 WL-WSJ 2865545. U.S. Gypsum had been lobbying Congress for a 
legislative solution but pointed to slower progress than expected combined with 
increasing settlement demands that are "completely out of proportion to our 
... liability." Id. Crown, Cork and Seal spent $100 million on asbestos litigation 
in 1999 and $160 million in 2000 and had estimated that its 2001 costs would be 
$275 million. MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: AsBESTOS, May 18, 2001, at 13. 
11 Bankruptcies have caused some plaintiffs' lawyers to file new claims at a 
"dizzying pace." Bill Geroux, Asbestos Lawsuits Multiply: Bankruptcies Chief 
Reason, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 2001, at B-2, available at 2001 WL 
5321831. As one publication that tracks asbestos litigation noted, "The cumulative 
effect of bankruptcy reorganization by many large asbestos defendants has left 
many of the remaining companies reeling as new claims remain on the rise with 
no end in sight." MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: AsBESTOS, May 18, 2001, at 13. That 
article reported the claim data for the following non-bankrupt defendants: (1) 
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The purpose of this article is not to argue that claimants 
suffering from serious asbestos-related diseases should not be 
compensated. To the contrary, one of the points of this article 
is that absent some change in the way asbestos claims are 
resolved,12 claimants who become truly sick in the future 
may not receive adequate compensation. Changing the current 
asbestos compensation system would be pro-claimant. 
Also, the purpose of this article is not to ascribe blame. 
Rather, it is to fix. a problem. The judges cannot be blamed for 
their good intentions. Neither can the plaintiffs' attorneys be 
blamed for zealously representing their clients-which is what 
they are doing here. 13 This normally produces great social 
good. However, in the case of asbestos, a seriously flawed 
system has resulted. 
I. THE CURRENT ASBESTOS CRISIS 
No one could have predicted that more than twenty-five 
years after asbestos product liability litigation emerged, courts 
would still be facing tens of thousands of new claims each 
year. Certainly no one would have predicted that by the year 
2000, over 200,000 asbestos cases would be clogging the courts 
with new claims increasing at a staggering rate. In fact, new 
claims against the largest asbestos defendants have averaged 
approximately 40,000 per year over the past several years. 14 
Two examples are noteworthy. In the year 2000 alone, 
60,000 claims were filed against the Manville Trust-a Trust 
established to handle asbestos claims against Johns-Manville 
Corp., which filed for bankruptcy in 1982. The year 2000 ava-
Owens-Illinois - 20,000 new claims in 2000 (compared to 12,000 new claims in 
1999), (2) Federal Mogul - 39,000 new claims in 2000, (3) Pfizer - 33,165 
pending claims against itself and 58,346 pending claims against its Quigley 
subsidiary in 2000 (compared to 26,890 pending claims against Pfizer in 1999 and 
57,328 pending claims against Quigley in 1999). Id . 
• 2 For a discussion concerning recent efforts to pass asbestos legislation, see 
James Reed, Federal Asbestos Legislation: The Search for a Strategy, HARRIS 
MARTIN COLUMNS: AsBESTOS, Apr. 2001 . 
• 3 They also get paid but so do the lawyers and businessmen on the other 
side. A system that pays people to look out for the interests of others is not a 
bad system .. 
'4 See Hearings, supra note 3. 
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lanche represented the greatest number of claims filed against 
Manville since 1989, the Trust's first full year of operation. 15 
The Trust also estimates that there will be 50% more claims 
in 2001 than the previous high-water mark set a year earli-
er. 16 Because of the flood of new claims, the Trust imposed a 
sixty-day moratorium to determine if it could continue to pay 
claims as it has inthe past.17 
Similarly, in a recent filing in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, W.R. Grace & Co. 
stated that in 2000 asbestos claims had increased 81% over 
the prior year, reaching a total of 49,000 claims.ls Moreover, 
in January of 2001, claims against W.R. Grace had increased 
374% over those in January of 2000, and February of 2001 
claims were 207% higher than February of 2000. 19 
Defendants have settled well over 300,000 claims, but 
these efforts to resolve the claims have failed to reduce the 
caseload. One defendant, Owens Corning, devised a National 
Settlement Program to settle as many claims as possible. That 
Settlement Program was cited by opponents of legislative 
reform as an example of why asbestos legislation was not 
necessary.20 But even after settling hundreds of thousands of 
claims, Owens Corning was forced to file for bankruptcy be-
cause claimants continued to bring more and more claims 
seeking larger and larger settlements.21 
15 See Letter from David Austern, President, Claims Resolution Management 
Corporation, to Attorneys Who File Manville Trust Claims (Mar. 26, 2001) (on file 
with author). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 W.R. Grace & Coo's Informational Brief at 38, In re W.R. Grace & Co. 
(Bankr. D. DeL Apr. 2, 2001) (No. 01-01139). 
19 Id. at 38-39. As a historical marker, prior to 1980, there were approximate-
ly 950 cases pending in the federal courts. See TERRENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT 
LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 36 
(1988). By 1985, that number increased four-fold to over 37,000 cases. [d.; see 
also DEBORAH R. HENSLER, AsBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 3 (1992). 
20 See H.R. REP. No. 106-782, at 67 (2000) (describing the Justice 
Department's views on behalf of the Clinton Administration). 
21 Owens Corning Files Voluntary Chapter 11 Petition to Resolve Asbestos 
Liability, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 2000; Joseph B. White & Jim VandeHei, Owens 
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While the initial focus of asbestos litigation was the as-
bestos producers and the manufacturers of asbestos products, 
over time the pool of defendants has grown. More than 2000 
companies or individuals have been named as asbestos defen-
dants in courts across the country, and the number of defen-
dants is growing.22 As the primary asbestos defendants have 
declared bankruptcy, the list of defendants has been expanded 
to include companies with little more than a remote connec-
tion to asbestos. 23 The new defendants are diverse, ranging 
from oil companies, to automobile manufacturers, to hospitals 
and colleges. They generally have an attenuated connection to 
asbestos. 24 Some of these peripheral defendants have already 
sought bankruptcy protection. 25 
Perhaps these developments in asbestos litigation-a 
substantial increase in both the number of claims and the 
number of peripheral defendants-would be understandable if 
the number of sick claimants were also increasing. But that is 
not the case. The bulk of the new cases are being filed by 
people who are not sick in a meaningful sense. As many as 
80% of new cases are brought by plaintiffs who suffer from no 
physical impairment,26 and it is likely that most of these 
Corning Files for Chapter 11, Citing Escalating Asbestos.Liability Claims, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 6, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 22612276. 
22 See Innocent Hurt in Asbestos Suits, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 3, 2001, at 21, 
available at 2001 WL 7240088; Douglas McLeod, Asbestos Continues to Bite Indus· 
try, Bus. INS., Jan. 8, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 5100719. 
23 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
2. Susan Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2000, at Bl, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3025073; see also 
Brubaker, supra note 2 (discussing order requiring Sears to pay $1.5 million to a 
seventy-eight-year-old man who purchased building materials containing asbestos 
from Sears fifty years ago). 
25 See, e.g., Engineering Firm Burns & Roe Files for Reorganization, Cites Re-
cent Spike in Claims, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: AsBESTOS, Jan. 5, 2001, at l. 
26 See Queena Sook Kim, G·I Holdings' Bankruptcy Filing Cites Exposure in 
Asbestos Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12 (citing report from G-I Hold-
ings, formerly GAF Corp., that "as many as 80% of its asbestos settlements are 
paid to unimpaired people"), available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2850312; see also Lester 
Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative 
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1853 (1992) (stating that in 1992, claims 
by the unimpaired "account[edl for sixty to seventy percent of new asbestos 
claims filed."). Allegations typically assert that plaintiffs may have future harm or 
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plaintiffs will never become ill from their exposure to asbes-
toS.27 If they had little or no costs, particularly to those who 
are or will become more compellingly ill, suits by such claim-
ants might be considered just. Yet the lawsuits by these rela-
tively unimpaired claimants are allowed to proceed and reduce 
the limited pool of resources available for those individuals 
who are much sicker or dying or will become sick with serious 
asbestos-related diseases in the future. 
That funds may not be available for these latter individu-
als has been apparent since the early 1990s. In 1990, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist convened a Judicial Conference Committee 
to examine the growing asbestos litigation problem.28 Mter 
extensive study, the Committee reported in 1991 that the 
"situation has reached critical dimensions and is getting 
worse. "29 Characterizing the state of asbestos litigation as "a 
disaster of major proportions to both the victims and the pro-
ducers of asbestos products," the Committee concluded that 
the courts were "ill-equipped" to address the mass of claims in 
an effective manner.30 The increasing caseload made long 
pre-trial delays increasingly "routine," while the continuing 
exhaustion of defendants' assets has raised a real prospect 
that "future claimants may lose altogether."31 
Recent awards to unimpaired or mildly impaired claim-
have only pleural plaques. "[Pleural) plaques are areas of (the pleura membrane 
covering the lung and chest wall) in which cell tissue is replaced by tougher 
tissue. Pleural plaques result from asbestos exposure 'but do not affect lung func-
tions and do not necessarily lead to asbestosis or increase the risk of cancer.'" 
Hearings, supra note 3 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor, Yale 
Law School). 
27 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 746-47, 750-51, 
812 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 
(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the mass, assembly-line medical screening programs 
employed by some attorneys for claimants); see also Tillinghast.Towers, supra note 
3 (indicating a significant majority of new claims are for non-malignant diseases). 
28 Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos Litig., Report to the Chief 
Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, MEALEY'S LITlG. REP.: AsBESTOS, Mar. 15, 1991, at 3. 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 3; see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 746-47, 
750-51, 812 (describing the backlog of asbestos personal injury cases). 
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ants illustrate the Committee's concern that truly sick claim-
ants may face a depleted pool of assets in the future. In Octo-
ber of 2001, a Mississippi jury awarded six. asbestos plaintiffs 
$150 million-$25 million each-even though none of the 
plaintiffs are sick from asbestos and may never become SO.32 
The plaintiffs claimed that in the future they may suffer as-
bestos-related diseases because their work, often decades ago, 
brought them into contact with asbestos-containing products. 
In March of 2001 a Texas jury awarded twenty-two plaintiffs, 
who were not seriously ill, $35. million for "future physical 
impairment" and "future medical costs although it is likely 
that these claimants will never become seriously ill. "33 There 
are many similar examples. In February of 1998, a Texas jury 
awarded $115.6 million in damages34 to twenty-one plaintiffs 
whose illnesses ranged from "mild" to "asymptomatic" asbesto-
sis, and even to "unconfirmed" illnesses.35 Also in 1998, a 
Mississippi state jury awarded between $2 million and $3.5 
million to two plaintiffs whose alleged asbestosis could not be 
detected by x-ray examinations.36 
How did we get here? Unfortunately, the courts them-
selves must share some of the responsibility. Many courts 
have adopted substantive or procedural mechanisms designed 
to streamline court dockets and move these cases through the 
system, without regard to the merits of the claims. While 
these judges undoubtedly had good intentions, they have actu-
ally made things worse by encouraging the filing and settle-
ment of questionable claims.37 As one commentator noted 
32 See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Jury Awards Six Asbestos Plaintiffs $25M Each, 
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at Bl; Patti Waldmeir, The Need for Damage Limita-
tion, FIN. TIMES (FT.com), Nov. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WL 28473877 
33 Two Asbestos Defendants Hit with $35 Million Verdict, 23 No.4, ANDREWS 
AsBESTOS LITIG. REP., Mar. 1, 2001, at 3. 
3. This $115.6 million included $15.6 million in compensatory damages and 
$100 million in punitive damages. McLeod, supra note 22. 
35 Id. 
36 Hearings, supra note 3. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A 
Letter to the Nation's Trial Judges: How the Focus on Effu:iency Is Hurting You 
and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 247 
(2000). 
37 For example, the court administrator in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, noted that 
"We are victims of our own success." Cuyahoga Asbestos Cases Abound, DAYTON 
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nearly four years ago, 
Judges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass torts 
through their litigation process at low transaction costs create 
the opportunity for new filings. They increase demand for 
new cases by their high resolution rates and low transaction 
costs. If you build a superhighway, there will be a traffic 
jam.3S 
9 
In the federal courts, all asbestos claims have been consol-
idated for pre-trial purposes before Senior United States Dis-
trict Judge Charles R. Weiner of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania (the federal MDL Panel). Thus, the same procedural 
rules implemented by the court, such as the severing of all 
punitive damages claims,39 have been used in connection with 
tens of thousands of claims. But state courts have adopted 
different and, often, contradictory rules. For example, some 
courts place suits brought by unimpaired claimants on an inac-
tive docket so that the seriously ill can be compensated first. 
Other courts however, such as courts in Mississippi,40 consoli-
date thousands of claims of relatively unimpaired people with 
the claims of those who are quite sick or dying. This practice 
tends to overcompensate the relatively unimpaired at the ex-
pense of the very sick. This lack of coordination can best be 
demonstrated with some concrete examples. 
DAILY NEWS, May 14, 2001, at 2-B, available at 2001 WL 21258316. That court's 
cases have grown from 4000 to 27,000 in just four years and the court "has be-
come so experienced at handling asbestos cases that even people who never lived 
or worked in Ohio file their lawsuits in the court." Id. 
38 Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass 
Torts, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997). 
39 In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Col-
lins v. Mac-Millan Bloedel, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2216 (2001). 4. See, e.g., John Porretto, Rural County Known for Huge Verdicts, BILOXI SUN 
HERALD, July 2, 2001 (discussing the negative impact on jobs, the cost of 
healthcare and availability of insurance); see also supra note 36. 
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II. THE LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG THE COURTS 
Early rulings in favor of asbestos claimants often resulted 
from the willingness of courts to stretch accepted legal princi-
pIes or develop new theories that permitted claims where tradi-
tional theories would have denied recovery. While clearly the 
result of good intentions--compensating people harmed by 
asbestos-such rulings only tended to encourage unmeritorious 
lawsuits. Faced with the addition of thousands of asbestos 
cases to their dockets, courts began to use a wide variety of 
substantive and procedural methods to try to manage the ever-
increasing caseload. Some of these mechanisms sought to take 
into account the problems posed by asbestos litigation such as 
limited resources and suits by unimpaired claimants. But most 
of the procedures adopted by the courts were designed to move 
cases along as if efficiency and expediency were the only impor-
tant factors; they ignored the prospect that claimants who 
actually become seriously ill in the future may not be adequate-
ly compensated, ignored important rights of defendants and 
ignored the impact of increasing numbers of defendant bank-
ruptcies. 
The different ways that courts have addressed the asbestos 
problem, can be seen by (1) the response by courts to the filings 
by unimpaired claimants, (2) the use by courts of mass joinders 
or mass trials in certain states, (3) the willingness of courts to 
permit the award of medical monitoring costs and (4) the fail-
ure of courts to account for the impact of punitive damages, 
including their in terrorem effect at the settlement table. 
A. Addressing the Dilemma of the Unimpaired Claimant 
At the heart of the current asbestos problem are claims 
brought by individuals who are not seriously ill or who may 
never become sick at all. As noted above, a large number of 
cases filed against asbestos defendants are filed by plaintiffs 
with no serious physical impairments. When these weak cases 
are consolidated with other cases, or when courts force settle-
ments of these weak cases by allowing the claims of the truly 
sick to be leveraged, the plaintiffs who are not ill use the plain-
HeinOnline -- 71 Miss. L.J. 11 2001-2002
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tiffs who are seriously ill to "inflate the value of those 
claims."41 Plaintiffs who are not seriously ill and suffer no 
physical impairment receive recoveries to the detriment of 
those plaintiffs who are seriously ill and dying. 
Only a relatively small portion of the current nationwide 
burden of asbestos lawsuits involves serious injuries.42 Only a 
small fraction of the cases present claims of severe asbestosis 
or asbestos-related malignancies such as lung cancer or meso-
thelioma. Far greater numbers involve conditions which, if 
present at all, are associated with little or no actual 
impairment.43 This has led Judge Weiner, who oversees the 
federal asbestos multidistrict proceedings, to note that "[o]nly a 
very small percentage of the cases filed have serious asbestos-
related affiictions, but they are prone to be lost in the shuffle 
with pleural and other non-malignancy cases."44 The influx of 
large numbers of claims by the relatively unimpaired defeats 
the purpose of the tort system: "that the sick and dying, their 
widows and survivors should have their claims addressed 
first.»45 Claimants' attorneys understandably fear, however, 
.1 Hearings, supra note 3; see also Patricia Waldmeir, A Legal System Insu-
lated from Logic: A New Surge of Asbestos Lawsuits is Bankrupting U.S. Business 
and Exposing the Failings of the Law, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at 12 . 
.. As Judge Weinstein has pointed out, large numbers of claims by plaintiffs 
without serious injury are often generated as a result of mass, "assembly-line" 
medical screening programs: 
[Some attorneys] have filed all of their cases without regard to the extent 
of injury. In conjunction with unions they have arranged through the use 
of medical trailers and the like to have x-rays taken of thousands of 
workers without manifestations of disease and then filed complaints for 
those that had any hint of pleural plaque. 
In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), vacat-
ed, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), on reh'g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993) . 
• 3 See In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Haw. 
1990) ("In virtually all pleural plaque and pleural thickening cases, plaintiffs 
continue to lead active, normal lives, with no pain or suffering, no loss of the use 
of an organ or disfigurement due to scarring.") . 
.. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 1996 WL 539589, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 12, 1996). 
45 In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1011 (2000). See generally Mark A. Behrens & Monica Parham, Stewardship for 
the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 
33 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: 
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that if they don't file claims for their relatively unimpaired cli-
ents, the statute of limitations may have run if and when the 
clients do become seriously ill. It is a valid concern and drives 
some of the problem. 
To date, only a handful of courts, such as the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, have been willing to take steps to ad-
dress this problem. That court has ruled that asymptomatic 
pleural thickening, unaccompanied by physical impairment, is 
not a compensable injury that gives rise to a cause of action.46 
Further, the court held that the discovery of pleural plaques or 
a non-malignant, asbestos-related lung pathology "does not 
trigger the statute of limitations with respect to an action for 
later, separately diagnosed disease of lung cancer.'>47 The court 
added "because asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a suffi-
cient physical injury, the resultant emotional distress damages 
are likewise not recoverable.oMs 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is an impor-
tant step in the right direction. First, the court's ruling ensures 
that those who are not seriously ill will not threaten the right 
to compensation of those who are.49 Second, the court affirmed 
that individuals need not file claims simply to avoid any stat-
ute of limitations issues; absent physical impairment the clock 
does not run. 50 
Cognizant of both the statute of limitations issue and the 
problems posed by unimpaired claimants, a few other courts 
have created pleural registries or inactive dockets pursuant to 
which the claims of those who cannot meet certain objective 
medical criteria are placed on an inactive docket where statute 
of limitations and similar defenses are tolled. For example, the 
Massachusetts inactive asbestos docket was created in Septem-
Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY 541 (1992) . 
• 6 See Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 237 (Pa. 1996) (upholding GitTear 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 632 A.2d 880 (Pa. 1993». 
47 Simnwns, 674 A.2d at 237 . 
•• [d. at 238. 
•• See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working 
Group on Mass Torts, Report on Mass Tort Litigation 2 (Feb. 15, 1999) (com-
ments of John Aldock, Esq., participant in Dec. 8, 1998, Mass Torts Working 
Group Conference). 
6. [d. 
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ber of 1986 through an amendment to an order creating a 
statewide consolidated asbestos docket. 51 The docket provides 
a mechanism by which plaintiffs who have been diagnosed with 
asbestos-related pleural diseases can toll all applicable statutes 
of limitations regarding their claims or the related claims of 
their families or estates, until their pleural conditions devel-
oped into either asbestosis or some type of malignancy. 52 
While on the inactive docket, cases are exempt from discov-
ery.53 
Similarly, the Circuit Court for Cook County, Illinois, cre-
ated a pleural registry system in March of 1991.54 In creating 
that system, the court recognized that asbestos litigation posed 
problems for parties: plaintiffs exhibiting no impairment filed 
claims out of fear that the statute of limitations would expire 
before their disease progressed to a stage that was medically 
recognized as impaired, while defendants expended substantial 
sums in appearing in and defending against such inchoate 
claims.55 
Under the Coqk County plan, claimants must file an As-
bestos Personal Injury Information Sheet. 56 Cases in which an 
asbestos-related cancer or mesothelioma is alleged may imme-
diately go on the active docket.57 Claimants who have a histo-
ry of asbestos exposure and demonstrate objective asbestos-
51 See Commonwealth of Mass., Middlesex Super. Ct., MAsSACHUSETrS STATE 
COURT AsBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY LITlG. ORDER, Sept. 1986. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. Similarly, pleural cases originally filed in the consolidated docket may 
be transferred to the inactive docket on plaintifi's motion, and thereafter become 
subject to all of the same provisions and requirements as cases originally filed on 
the inactive docket. Id. 
54 See Order to Establish Registry for Certain Asbestos Matters, In re Asbes-
tos Cases (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. Mar. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Registry Order!. 
The pleural registry in Cook County was created by Judge Dean Trafalet who 
handled the asbestos cases for a fourteen-year period that ended in 1998. When 
Judge Trafalet took over the asbestos cases there were 8000 cases pending, but 
today there are about 875 pending cases with another 1200 cases on the pleural 
registry. See Rooney, supra note 2. 
.. Registry Order, supra note 54. 
56 Id. All claims must be filed individually, as the Order prohibits claims on 
behalf of groups or classes of claimants. Id. 
57 Id. 
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related physical findings (such as pleural plaques) but who 
either do not meet the minimum criteria for impairment, as 
defined in the Order, or who have not manifested a cancer 
certified as asbestos-related, as defined in the Order, place 
their claims on the registry.58 While on the registry, claims 
are exempt from discovery and "shall not 'age' for any pur-
pose."59 
Other courts have also begun to acknowledge the unim-
paired claimant problem. Recently, the Texas Supreme Court 
addressed a statute of limitations question arising out of an 
asbestos claim and, in that context, noted the problems raised 
by compensating unimpaired claimants. In Pustejovsky v. Rap-
id American Corp.,60 the issue before the court was whether a 
plaintiff could bring separate actions for separate latent asbes-
tos diseases.61 The court found that a claim for malignant as-
bestos disease would not be barred by the statute of limitations 
even where a previous claim for asbestos exposure or minimal 
impairment had been filed. The court concluded that it was 
better to allow the second action because otherwise, claimants 
would feel compelled to bring premature and vague claims 
(such as fear of cancer) to avoid statute of limitations issues. 
The court specifically identified its concern that giving damages 
to claimants who are not sick in a meaningful sense would 
result in the overcompensation of those who do not get a dis-
ease and a "systematic under-compensation" for those who 
do.62 
B. Mass Joinders and Mass Trials 
Perhaps the most troubling procedural mechanism used by 
courts to resolve large numbers of asbestos claims has been the 
mass joinder or mass trial of thousands of individual claims 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000). 
61 The court noted that it had previously held that a claimant who had been 
exposed to asbestos but had not developed a serious asbestos-related disease could 
not bring a claim for fear of developing such disease. Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 
648-50. 
62 Id. at 650. 
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which include claims by both those who are demonstrably sick 
and those who are unimpaired. The use of this procedural con-
glomeration threatens both the right of the seriously ill plain-
tiffs to be fully compensated and the right of defendants to fair 
process. 
1. Mississippi 
Although Mississippi does not have court procedures that 
allow for class actions, Mississippi joinder rules do allow for the 
joinder of hundreds or thousands of claimants from across the 
country in one case. Under Mississippi rules, it does not matter 
how many plaintiffs are from out-of-state so long as one of the 
plaintiffs is a Mississippi resident who is suing one out-of-state 
defendant.63 This "one and all" rule is procedurally similar to 
class actions but without the same level of protection.64 Mass 
joinder of asbestos claims in Mississippi courts, in conjunction 
with Mississippi rules that provide limited time for discovery, 
can be used to limit the procedural protections to which defen-
dants are generally entitled.65 
A Mississippi case that highlights the problem is Cosey v. 
E.n. Bullard CO.,66 a consolidated case where a trial involving 
twelve of the 1738 plaintiffs resulted in a jury verdict of $48.5 
million.67 The judge advised the defendants to settle with the 
.. See Mark Ballard, Mississippi Becomes a Mecca for Tort Suits, NATL L.J., 
Apr. 27, 2001 (describing Mississippi as "mecca for plaintiffs lawyers"); Stephen 
Labatron, Top Asbestos Makers Agree to Settle 2 Large Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2000, at 22. 
64 See, e.g., MISS. UNIF. R. OF CIR. & COUNTY CT. PRAC. § 4.04A (requiring 
that discovery be completed within ninety days of filing of answer). 
65 According to one former Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, the 
joinder rules were never intended to authorize the type of "quasi-class litigation" 
that takes place. Jerry Mitchell, Out-of-State Cases, In-State Headaches, CLARION-
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at I-A. If this multi-claimant litigation 
had been intended, a class action rule would have been proposed, according to an-
other former Mississippi Supreme Court Chief Justice, who added that "[w)e did 
not favor class-action suits for reasons that it was burdensome, and our courts 
weren't equipped to handle them." Id. Other procedural mechanisms in Mississippi 
attract asbestos claimants. Labatron, supra note 63. For example, in Mississippi 
defendants have no right to perform medical exams. See id. 
66 Civ. No. 95-0069 (Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, Miss. 1995). 
67 Motion for Disqualification and Recusal of Judge at 5, Cosey, Civ. No. 95-
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remaining plaintiffs, or he would try them immediately in front 
of the same jury, with an instruction to find the defendants lia-
ble.68 When counsel for the defendants said the plan sounded 
"like this side of hell," the judge corrected him saying, "No 
counsel, this is hell."69 As one defendant's general counsel re-
marked, "It's no secret that there are state courtrooms in Mis-
sissippi which have become notorious for awarding outlandish 
verdicts to asbestos claimants who are not sick and as a result, 
asbestos cases from all over the country tend to migrate 
there.,,7o 
Not surprisingly, Mississippi's rules have resulted in fo-
rum-shopping.71 Over the past few years the number of plain-
tiffs filing suit in Jefferson County has exceeded the number of 
Jefferson County residents. 72 In early 2001, two new asbestos 
suits were filed in Mississippi, one including over 2000 claim-
ants 73 and a second involving over 7000 claimants,74 a major-
ity of whom did not reside in Mississippi. Unfortunately, it ap-
pears this trend will continue. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
recently rejected a request to correct the problem in American 
Bankers Insurance Co. v. Alexander.75 There the court af-
firmed the joinder of 1371 plaintiffs in a case in Jefferson 
County, and made no attempt to change Mississippi's joinder rules.76 
0069 [hereinafter Motion to Recusel. Punitive damages were to be decided in a 
separate phase of the trial. Id. 
68 Id. at 5-6; see also Hearings, supra note 3 (noting that the plaintiffs in 
Cosey, whose disease could not be detected by x-ray, were awarded between $2 
million and $3.5 million each). 
69 Motion to Recuse, supra note 67, at 6. 
70 Labatron, supra note 63 (quoting Richard A. Weinberg, General Counsel for 
GAF Corp.). 
71 See The Cloud Grows Darker over Our Judiciary System, THE TIMES 
(Lamar County, Miss.), June 28, 2001 (describing efforts to sign up plaintiffs to 
bring suit in certain Mississippi counties). 
72 Jerry Mitchell, Jefferson County Ground Zero for Cases, CLARION-LEDGER 
(Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at I-A. Since 1999, the number of plaintiffs that 
have filed suit in Jefferson County, Mississippi (more than 10,000), has outnum-
bered the total number of people in the county (9740). Id. 
73 Third Amended Complaint 1, Ex. A at 1-31, Bankston v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., No. 2000-17-CVI (Cir. Ct., Jones County, Miss. Mar. 20, 2001). 
7. Amended Complaint 1, Ex. A at 1-146, Williams v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 
No. 2001-6-CV3 (Cir. Ct., Jones County, Miss. May 29, 2001). 
75 No. 98-IA-0046-SCT, 2001 WL 83952 (Miss. Feb. 1, 2001). 
76 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 2001 WL 83952, at *1. Nevertheless, one current Su-
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2. West Virginia 
The West Virginia courts have used mass trials for tens of 
thousands of asbestos claims. Beginning with the first consoli-
dated trial in 1989, over 20,000 asbestos claims have been 
included in mass trial groupS.77 These trials did not address 
all liability issues. Instead, there were no named plaintiffs pre-
sented to the jury, and the issue to be resolved was whether 
any of the numerous defendants had either manufactured a 
defective product or maintained a workplace which was not 
reasonably safe. The mass trials also determined whether some 
of the defendants had acted in a manner that would warrant 
an award of punitive damages and asked the jury to develop a 
"multiplier" for calculating such damages.78 A second phase 
was contemplated which would only then focus on the 
defendant's liability and the amount of the compensatory dam-
ages.79 Although the ostensible purpose of this procedure was 
to avoid repetitive litigation, the goal was to "provide the op-
portunity for the parties to settle massive numbers of cases at 
one sitting.,,80 
In 1996, the West Virginia Supreme Court had the oppor-
tunity to address the viability of these mass trials in a situa-
tion where there were no common issues among the defendants 
who each allegedly had maintained an unreasonably safe 
workplace.81 The plaintiffs had allegedly worked in various 
facilities owned by different defendants all of which were in 
West Virginia.82 These "premises"-related defendants chal:· 
preme Court Justice has expressed support for a rule addressing who can access 
Mississippi courtrooms. See Toni Terrett, Supreme Court Justice Books Tort Re-
form, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 18, 200l. 
77 See Preliminary Reply of the Respondent, A. Andrew MacQueen, with Ob-
jections and Motions at 5, Mobile Oil Corp. v. MacQueen, No. 29768 (W. Va. May 
25, 2001) [hereinafter Preliminary Reply of Judge MacQueenl. 
7. Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 West Virginia ex ret. Appalachian Power Co. v. MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d 300 
(W. Va. 1996). 
82 MacQueen, 479 S.E.2d at 302. 
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lenged the trial court's consolidation of a number of separate 
civil actions filed on behalf of individuals who claimed physical 
injuries stemming from asbestos exposure which occurred while 
the plaintiffs were "constructing, repairing, and/or maintaining 
various facilities" owned by the defendants. 83 The Supreme 
Court of West Virginia ruled that the consolidation plan was 
appropriate and provided the trial court with "broad authority" 
for resolving as many claims as quickly as possible.84 
Until recently, however, it appeared that some change 
might be forthcoming. The West Virginia Supreme Court 
elected to consolidate virtually all West Virginia asbestos 
claims before one judge under West Virginia's mass litigation 
procedures. As part of the Mass Litigation Panel proceedings, 
the judge in charge held a series of meetings with counsel for 
plaintiffs and defendants to formulate a plan for proceeding 
with the asbestos cases.S5 Plaintiffs sought to continue the 
trial practices that made West Virginia an attractive jurisdic-
. tion. Plaintiffs requested "a consolidated, common issues trial 
for all pending asbestos cases,,,S6 arguing that past consolida-
tions "created important, substantive rights" and therefore, a 
denial of those procedures in the future "raise [d) issues of a 
denial of substantive due process and equal protection to the 
... members of the ... class under both the Constitution of 
West Virginia and the United States Constitution."87 The mo-
tion was denied, and the court instead scheduled "a series of 
small-group, all-issues trials"s8 (although Judge MacQueen 
argued that an inactive docket may violate the West Virginia 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 305. 
as Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Writ Granted as Moulded at 5, West Vir-
ginia ex rel. Ronald Allman v. MacQueen, No. 29767 (W. Va. July 6, 2001) 
[hereinafter W. Va. Mandamus Ruling). 
86 Plaintiffs Represented by the Law Offices of Stuart Calwell, PLLC; Peyton, 
Parenti & Whittington; the Law Office of John E. Sutter; Hartley & O'Brien Law 
Offices; James F. Humphrey & Associates, L.C.; and Harvit & Schwartz, L.C.'s 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Earlier Motion for Mass Trial at 1, In re 
Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation, No. 00-Misc-222 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawha County, 
W. Va. Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Motion for Mass Trial!. 
87 Id. at 2. 
88 W. Va. Mandamus Ruling, supra note 85, at 5. 
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Constitution).89 
Unfortunately, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed 
course and, while allowing at least some of the small-group, all-
issues trials to proceed, made clear that it expected to see larg-
er consolidated trials. The court appointed a new "supervising 
judge" to schedule a new series of meetings with counsel for 
plaintiffs and defendants to consider the types of larger trial 
groups that should be scheduled.90 The court said that those 
trial groups might include, among other things, "cases involv-
ing the premises liability theory," "cases with issues susceptible 
to mass trial of all or most parties" and "cases involving com-
mon product exposure.,,91 Thus, mass trials will probably be 
back in West Virginia in the future. 
3. Maryland 
Trial courts in Baltimore, Maryland, have also consolidated 
thousands of asbestos claims. The first mass trial, held in 1992, 
was broken into phases and, as in West Virginia, focused on 
general issues of liability and punitive damages. Following the 
mass trial, the court scheduled a series of smaller trial groups 
or mini-trials to resolve the remaining issues specific to indi-
vidual claimant issues. Rather than resolving claims quickly 
and efficiently, ten years later these mini-trials have yet to be 
concluded.92 In February of this year, a judge in Baltimore 
Circuit Court approved a settlement of over 6800 asbestos-
Injury cases, which had been pending in the system for 
years. 93 
89 Preliminary Reply of Judge MacQueen, supra note 77, at 1-2. 
90 W. Va. Mandamus Ruling, supra note 85, at 17. 
91 Id. at 18. The West Virginia Supreme Court noted that it believed that any 
constitutional issues were premature because the specific types of trials to be held 
had not been decided yet. Id. 
92 Memorandum and Opinion, In re Baltimore City Asbestos Personal Injury 
and Wrongful Death Cases, No. 92344501 {Baltimore Cir. Ct. May 9, 2001). In 
order to avoid similar problems, the Baltimore court subsequently adopted an 
inactive docket similar to those used in Massachusetts and Cook County, Illinois. 
Id. at 2. Challenges to the viability of that inactive docket have been denied. Id. 
93 Caitlin Francke, Asbestos Lawsuits to Be Settled, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 14, 
2001, at 1-B, auailable at 2001 WL 6150935. 
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Mass trials and mass consolidations are perhaps the most 
obvious examples of case management techniques designed to 
resolve cases quickly but which actually end up encouraging 
the filing of more asbestos claims. Such procedures take the 
focus away from the merits of individual claims (while often 
ignoring the due process rights of defendants) and allow non-
meritorious claims to flourish. More importantly, mass trials 
and mass consolidations provide a mechanism which increases 
the value of unimpaired claims at the expense of truly sick 
plaintiffs, further reducing the limited pools of resources and 
increasing the likelihood that future deserving claimants will 
not be fully compensated. 
C. Medical Monitoring 
Plaintiffs in medical monitoring cases seek post-exposure, 
pre-symptom recovery for the expense of periodic medical ex-
aminations to detect the onset of physical harm (which mayor 
may not occur). Some courts have permitted recovery for medi-
cal monitoring, but many have rejected it.94 Medical monitor-
ing, like recovery for expected future impairment or fear there-
of, may have its place in tort law, but in the asbestos litigation, 
this device has become a caricature. 
Recognition of medical monitoring absent physical injury 
could have enormous consequences for asbestos litigation given 
the massive number of individuals who were exposed to asbes-
tos at some level. If even a small fraction of these individuals 
were to seek recovery for medical monitoring, the effects on 
future claimants, the court system and the remaining solvent 
defendants could be far-reaching. As one court explained: 
There is little doubt that millions of people have suffered 
exposure to hazardous substances. Obviously, allowing in-
dividuals who have not suffered any demonstrable injury from 
such exposure to recover the costs of future medical monitor-
ing in a civil action could potentially devastate the court sys-
tem as well as defendants .... Allowing today's generation of 
94 See generally Victor E. Schwartz et aI., Medical Monitoring - Should Tort 
Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1059-71 (1999) (discussing the case 
law on medical monitoring). 
HeinOnline -- 71 Miss. L.J. 21 2001-2002
2001] THE NEVER-ENDING ASBESTOS CRISIS 
exposed but uninjured plaintiffs to recover may lead to 
tomorrow's generation of exposed and injured plaintiffs [sic] 
being remediless. 95 
21 
These serious practical concerns led the United States 
Supreme Court in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. 
Buckley96 to reject medical monitoring in Federal Employers' 
Liability Act (FELA)97 cases.98 One of the Court's primary 
concerns in Buckley was that medical monitoring would permit 
literally "tens of millions of individuals" to justify "some form of 
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring."99 As a result, 
defendants would be exposed to unlimited liability, and a 
"'flood' of less important cases" would drain the pool of resourc-
es available for meritorious claims by plaintiffs with serious, 
present injury.loo The Court concluded: 
[W]e are more troubled than is [the dissent] by the potential 
systemic effects of creating a new, full-blown, tort law cause 
of action-for example, the effects upon interests of other 
potential plaintiffs who are not before the court and who 
depend on a tort system that can distinguish between reliable 
and serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and rela-
tively trivial claims on the other. IOI 
Equally instructive on this point is the Texas Supreme 
Court's more recent decision in Temple-Inland Forest Products 
Corp. v. Carter. 102 In rejecting a "fear of disease" claim 
.. Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372. (S.D. W. Va. 1990), affd, 
958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991). 
.. 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
97 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). FELA is a federal statute that dermes rights 
and duties in personal injury cases brought by railroad workers against their em-
ployer railroads. FELA is something like a tort equivalent of workers' compensa-
tion for the railroad field. 
98 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442-43. 
99 Id. at 442. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 443-44. Similar concerns recently led the Nevada and Alabama Su-
preme Courts to reject medical monitoring in Badillo u. American Brands, Inc., 16 
P.3d 435 (Nev. 2001), and Hinton ex rel. Hinton u. Monsanto Co., 2001 WL 
1073699 (Ala. Sept. 14, 2001). 
102 993 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1999). 
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brought by a person who was exposed to asbestos, but had no 
physical injury, the court explained: 
The difficulty in predicting whether exposure will cause any 
disease and if so, what disease, and the long latency period 
characteristic of asbestos-related diseases, make it very diffi-
cult for judges and juries to evaluate which exposure claims 
are serious and which are not. This difficulty in turn makes 
liability unpredictable, with some claims resulting in signifi-
cant recovery while virtually indistinguishable claims are 
denied altogether. Some claimants would inevitably be over-
compensated when, in the course of time, it happens that they 
never develop the disease they feared, and others would be 
undercompensated when it turns out that they developed a 
disease more serious even than they feared. Also, claims for 
exposure could proliferate because in our society, as the Su-
preme Court observed, "contacts, even extensive contacts, with 
serious carcinogens are common. ,,103 
For this reason, the Texas Supreme Court was reluctant to 
stray from the bedrock rule, taken from the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, that a showing of actual injury is an indispens-
able element of a tort cause of action. 104 The court stated: "If 
recovery were allowed in the absence of present disease, indi-
viduals might feel obliged to bring suit for such recovery pro-
phylactically, against the possibility of future consequences 
from what is now an inchoate risk," which would "exacerbate 
not only the multiplicity of suits but the unpredictability of re-
sults. "105 
Sound public policy dictates that courts maintain the 200-
year-old principle that causes of action generally require proof 
of a present physical injury.106 The traditional physical injury 
103 Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 93 (emphasis added). 
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (stating that defendant 
should not be held liable for emotional disturbance absent physical injury); see 
also Purjet v. Hess Oil V.1. Corp., 1986 WL 1200, *4 <n.V.1. Jan. 8, 1986) (apply-
ing Virgin Islands law) ("We are bound, however, to follow the Restatement's rule 
that actual injury is an indispensable element of a tort cause of action," including 
medical monitoring claims.) 
lOS Temple-Inland, 993 S.W.2d at 93. 
106 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF 
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rule serves a number of important functions with respect to 
medical monitoring claims. First, it prevents courts from being 
flooded with thousands of new claims. As one set of commenta-
tors has pointed out, with an estimated thirty-eight percent of 
all cancers attributable to occupational exposure to toxic chemi-
cals and 50,000 hazardous waste sites in the United States, "in 
the very near future we may all have reasonable grounds to 
allege that some negligent business exposed us to hazardous 
substances and to get medical experts to testify that the expo-
sure significantly increased our risk of disease."107 It was pre-
cisely this concern that persuaded the United States Supreme 
Court to refuse to allow medical monitoring claims in the 
Buckley decision. 108 
Furthermore, medical monitoring awards are often totally 
unnecessary. Most workers today already receive access to 
medical check-ups through a health plan. l09 A tort award 
would simply provide a windfall recovery. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Buckley, "where state and federal regulations 
already provide the relief that a [medical monitoring] plaintiff 
seeks, creating a full-blown tort remedy could entail systemic 
costs without corresponding benefits" because recovery would 
be allowed "irrespective of the presence of a 'collateral 
source.'"uo 
In addition, medical monitoring awards are subject to seri-
ous abuse. If awarded in a lump-sum, there is no guarantee 
that any recovery will actually be spent on medical monitor-
TORTS 361 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the majority of courts do not allow recov-
ery for mental distress unless there is a physical injury). 
107 Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for MedicaL Monitor· 
ing: Warranted or WastefuL?, 20 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 121, 130 (1995); see aLso 
Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking MedicaL Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REV. I, 13 (1998) 
("According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), biL-
Lions of pounds of hazardous chemicals are emitted into the air each year, and 
nearly twenty percent of the U.S. population (approximately 40 million people) 
live within four miles of a hazardous waste site that the EPA has placed on its 
National Priority List."} (footnotes omitted). 
108 See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997). 
109 Approximately eighty percent of all standard medical testing is paid for by 
third-party insurance. 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJU-
Ry-REPORTERS' STUDY 379 (1991). 
110 BuckLey, 521 U.S. at 443. 
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ing. III In fact, evidence suggests that lump-sum awards are 
more likely to be spent in the short-term than to be saved for 
future medical monitoring.1I2 This will almost certainly be 
true in the vast majority of cases where monitoring is already 
provided by a "collateral source." 
Moreover, the social risk associated with making medical 
monitoring too readily available to the millions of persons in 
our society who can claim exposure to toxic substances, includ-
ing asbestos, will have the effect of compensating those who are 
unimpaired or slightly impaired at the expense of those who 
are seriously injured. When courts permit large damage awards 
for medical monitoring, less money is available to compensate 
those who have serious injuries or will develop serious injuries 
in the future. 
These serious problems will only be exacerbated if claim-
ants seeking medical monitoring are permitted to pursue recov-
ery through the vehicle of class action litigation. People who 
suffer actual asbestos-related injuries may be unable to obtain 
compensation for their injuries if funds are further depleted for 
monitoring classes of individuals who have no present physical 
injury, and may never become sick. 
Despite these facts, some state courts still permit plaintiffs 
to recover damages for medical monitoring even in the absence 
of injury. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a suit 
brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs that had not filed suit 
for asbestos disease or injury, ruled that for an asymptomatic 
claimant exposed to asbestos, "the reasonable cost of medical 
monitoring is a compensable item of damage ... provided that 
a plaintiff satisfies [certain) criteria."113 As a result of this 
111 As one commentator has noted, "[tlhe incentive for healthy plaintiffs to 
carefully hoard their award, and faithfully spend it on periodic medical examina-
tions to detect an illness they will in all likelihood never contract, seems negli-
gible." Arvin Maskin et aI., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving 
Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 521, 540-41 (2000). 
112 George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue· Veillance: A History and Critique of the 
Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 
257 n.158 (1993) (footnote in title omitted). 
113 Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 97-3188, pp. 8-9 (La. 7/8/98), 716 So. 
2d 355, 360. The court identified seven criteria that needed to be established: 
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ruling, the Louisiana Legislature amended its law to eliminate 
medical monitoring as a compensable item. Specifically, the 
amendment stated, "Damages do not include costs for future 
medical treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures of any 
kind unless such treatment, services, surveillance, or proce-
dures are directly related to a manifest physical or mental 
injury or disease.,,114 
But in April of 2001, the Louisiana Supreme Court spoke 
again on the issue, this time holding that the Legislature's 
decision to eliminate medical monitoring was unconstitutional 
to the extent that the law was applied retroactively (i.e., to the 
extent the plaintiff already had a "vested property right" in a 
cause of action it could not be divested by a subsequent stat-
ute).1l5 The upshot of the ruling was to permit large numbers 
of claimants who acknowledged they were unimpaired to seek 
(1) Significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance. 
(2) As a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff suffers a signifi-
cantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease. 
(3) Plaintiffs risk of contracting such a serious latent disease is 
greater than (a) the risk of contracting the same disease had he or she 
not been exposed and (b) the chances of members of the public at large 
of developing the disease. 
(4) A monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of 
the disease possible. 
(5) The monitoring procedure has been prescribed by a qualified 
physician and is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific 
principles. 
(6) The prescribed monitoring regime is different from that normally 
recommended in the absence of exposure. 
(7) There is some demonstrated clinical value in the early detection 
and diagnosis of the disease. 
Bourgeois, pp. 9-11, 716 So. 2d at 360-61. To this list, the court added that the 
"costs must be both reasonable and limited in duration to the maximum latency 
period (if known) of the diseases for which there is an increased risk." [d. at p. 11, 
716 So. 2d at 361. 
11. LA. ClV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). 
115 Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 2000-1528, pp. 11-12 (La. 4/3/01), 783 
So. 2d 1251, 1260-61. 
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medical monitoring costs in the courts, depleting funds avail-
able to compensate those claimants who are or may become 
sick. lls 
D. Managing Punitive Damages Claims 
Continuing to award punitive damages in asbestos cases no 
longer makes sense. The purpose of punitive damages in prod-
uct liability cases is to punish manufacturers for the injuries 
their products caused and to deter others from doing the 
same. ll7 It would be difficult to argue that punitive damages 
awards in asbestos cases over the past twenty years have not 
adequately punished asbestos manufacturers. Moreover, indi-
viduals responsible for decisions relating to asbestos products 
no longer work at these corporations and in most cases are 
dead. Punishing corporations for decisions made years before 
the present management was in power does not serve the pur-
pose of punitive damages. 
When the threat of large punitive damage awards is used 
to increase settlement amounts, punitive damages become a 
means of extortion rather than the corrective and deterrent 
they are intended to be. Thus, continued use of punitive dam-
ages not only violates a defendant's rights,118 it threatens fu-
116 The court held that because the plaintiffs, before passage of the statute, 
had filed an amended petition alleging the seven criteria, they could pursue their 
medical monitoring claims. Bourgeois II, p. 12, 783 So. 2d at 1260-61; see Crooks 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2001-0466, pp. 3-4 (La. 5/25/01), 785 So. 2d 810, 812 
(stating that the court should determine whether the seven criteria from Bour-
geois I occurred before Act 989 went into effect). 
117 See, e.g., RESI'ATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1939) (noting that the func-
tions of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ 
ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 549 
(lOth ed. 2000) (describing the origin and purpose of punitive damages). 
118 See King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1031 (5th Cir. 
1990) ("It must be said that a strong arguable basis exists for applying the due 
process clause ... to a jury's award of punitive damages in a mass tort con-
text."); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1989) ("We agree that 
the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the same course of conduct may 
raise serious constitutional concerns, in the absence of any limiting principle."); 
McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (M.D. Ga. 1990) ("[Dlue 
process may place a limit on the number of times and the extent to which a 
defendant may be subjected to punishment for a single course of conduct."); 
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[T)he 
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ture plaintiffs by driving defendant corporations into bankrupt-
cy, thereby depleting the pool available for compensatory dam-
ages.119 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
recently recognized many of these same concerns. In In re Col-
lins,120 the Third Circuit had the opportunity to consider the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's decision not to re-
mand punitive damages claims for trial together with the re-
mainder of personal injury claims arising from asbestos expo-
sure. l2l The court was convinced that there was a "compel-
ling" public policy rationale for severing the claimants' punitive 
damage claims: 
The resources available to persons injured by asbestos 
are steadily being depleted. The continuing filings of 
bankruptcy by asbestos defendants disclose that the process is 
accelerating. It is responsible public policy to give priority to 
compensatory claims over exemplary punitive damage wind-
falls; this prudent conservation more than vindicates the 
Panel's decision to withhold punitive damage claims on re-
mand. It is discouraging that while the Panel and transferee 
court follow this enlightened practice, some state courts allow 
punitive damages in asbestos cases. The continued hemor-
rhaging of available funds deprives current and future victims 
of rightful compensation. 122 
court holds that due process places a limit on the number of times and the ex-
tent to which a defendant may be subjected to punishment for a single course of 
conduct. Regardless of whether a sanction is labeled 'civil' or 'criminal' in nature, 
it cannot be tolerated under the requirements of due process if it amounts to 
unrestricted punishment."). 
119 See Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 
1990) (~If no change occurs in our tort or constitutional law, the time will arrive 
when [a defendant's) liability for punitive damages imperils its ability to pay com-
pensatory claims"); Bishop v. Gen. Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D.N.J. 
1996) ("Indeed, one of the many cogent criticisms of punitive damages is that 
multiple punitive [damage) liability can both bankrupt a defendant and preclude 
recovery for tardy plaintiffs."). 
120 233 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Collins v. Mac-Millan 
Bloedel, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2216 (2001). 
121 Collins, 233 F.3d at 810. 
122 [d. at 812. Other courts have also severed punitive damages claims. For 
example, in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, Judge Panella severed all puni-
tive damages claims from discovery, pre-trial motions and trial, ruling that any 
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Yet many courts have not been willing to take similar 
steps to curb the impact of punitive damages claims. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court of Montana had to decide whether 
W.R. Grace & Co. could present evidence of the scope of asbes-
tos litigation it faced as well as hypothetical average amounts 
for each pending claim during a mini-trial on punitive damag-
es. l23 The purpose of that evidence was to show that an 
award of punitive damages could threaten the ability of sick 
claimants to obtain compensation. 124 The trial court permitted 
W.R. Grace to introduce an economic expert who performed a 
series of calculations in order to approximate the potential 
damages facing the company in comparison to the company's 
net worth. 125 
However, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence - finding 
that such evidence is irrelevant to the issue of punitive damag-
es, as well as "highly speculative."126 On remand, W.R. Grace 
would have been unable to introduce such expert testimony and 
thus, the jury would have been unaware of the impact of a 
large punitive damages award on seriously ill claimants. W.R. 
Grace has since sought bankruptcy protection following a flood 
of new asbestos claims. 
III. A GLOBAL VIEW Is NEEDED 
In mass tort litigation, such as the asbestos litigation, 
when a judge in one state acts, he or she not only affects the 
plaintiffs and defendants in that state, but also current and 
future plaintiffs and defendants in all other states. Imagine the 
frustration of one judge, coping with the impact of depleted 
funds and mounting bankruptcies by setting for trial only the 
discovery with respect to punitive damages would not occur until after a plaintiff 
was successful on his compensatory damages claims. In re Asbestos Litig., No. 
C0048GV2001000003, slip. op. at 2 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Northampton County, 
Pa. Jan. 11, 2001). 
123 Finstad v. W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 MT 228, 'lI 7, 8 P.3d 778, 781. 
12. Finstad, 'i 46, 8 P.3d at 787. 
125 Id. 'i 40, 8 P.3d at 785. 
12. Id. 'i'i 48-49, 8 P.3d at 787. 
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cases of those who are sick or have died from an asbestos dis-
ease, watching a judge in another state allow unimpaired 
claimants to achieve compensation as part of a mass consolidat-
ed trial. With no end in sight to the asbestos litigation crisis, 
courts must reexamine the procedural mechanisms and sub-
stantive rules they have adopted to determine whether they are 
actually making the problem worse. 
Unfortunately, courts are often hesitant to take a global 
view of the problem at the expense of the citizens of their state. 
For example, a state judge may be unwilling to prevent plain-
tiffs in his or her state from receiving punitive damages if a 
similarly situated plaintiff in another state will not be preclud-
ed from receiving them. 127 This state-centric view of the liti-
gation is not just a theory. For example, in West Virginia, the 
plaintiffs submission to the West Virginia Mass Litigation 
Panel actually argued that a mass consolidated trial of all 
asbestos claims was necessary because of the supposed "risk of 
bankruptcy filings on the part of the remaining asbestos manu-
facturing defendants" as well as "the drain of defendant dollars 
to other litigation in other states where litigation plans are in 
effect. ,,128 More specifically, the plaintiffs argued that "if the 
dollars are not being demanded in West Virginia, they will be 
spent elsewhere until they are all gone."129 
127 See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(noting that "a state otherwise willing to impose such self-denying limits might be 
disinclined to do so until assured that others would follow suit"). 
128 Plaintiffs' Motion for Mass Trial, supra note 86, at 7. 
129 Id. at 7 n.3. In two separate opinions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals has reflected on this potential transfer of wealth in general. In Garnes u. 
Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991), the court stated: 
State courts have adopted standards that are, for the most part, not 
predictable, not consistent and not uniform. Such fuzzy standards inevi-
tably are most likely to be applied arbitrarily against out-of-state defen-
dants. Moreover, this is a problem that state courts are by themselves 
incapable of correcting regardless of surpassing integrity and boundless 
goodwill. State courts cannot weigh the appropriate trade-ofTs in cases 
concerning the national economy and national welfare when these trade-
ofTs involve benefits that accrue outside the jurisdiction of the forum and 
detriments that accrue inside the jurisdiction of the forum. 
Garnes, 413 S.E.2d at 905. Earlier in Blankenship u. General Motors Corp., 406 
S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991), the court opined: 
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The lack of a coordinated approach results in compensation 
based on forum rather than merit. A recent settlement illus-
trates this problem. In November of 1999, eighteen of the 
nation's leading asbestos makers agreed to settle two of the 
largest asbestos personal injury cases for $160 million. 130 
However, the money was not allocated to plaintiffs based on 
the severity of injury, but apparently on where they lived. 131 
For example, $263,000 went to each of 246 plaintiffs who lived 
in four counties in Mississippi and who suffered injuries. 182 
Seven Texas plaintiffs only received $43,500 each.133 But 2645 
residents of Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania who had similar 
injuries only received $14,000 each. 134 
In the absence of federal legislation, judges must look out-
side their own "asbestos fiefdoms"135 and make decisions that 
will help resolve the problem at a national level. They must 
cooperate and work toward a global approach to these cases. 
"Through [such] cooperation, judges can promote efficiency and 
Indeed, in some world other than the one in which we live, where this 
Court were called upon to make national policy, we might very well take 
a meat ax to some current product liability rules. Therefore, we do not 
claim that our adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs comports, necessarily, 
with some Platonic ideal of perfect justice. Rather, for a tiny state incapa-
ble of controlling the direction of the national law in terms of appropriate 
trade-offs among employment, research, development, and compensation 
for the injured users of products, the adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs 
is simple self-defense. 
Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d. at 786. 
130 See Labatron, supra note 63 (noting that these Mississippi cases involved 
almost 4000 plaintiffs from five states). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State 
Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1880 (2000). Professor 
McGovern stated that the "ubiquity and massness of the tort should lead to coop-
eration among judges." [d. at 1867. He proposed a cooperative strategy that 
judges can use to deal with the many problems associated with mass torts. Spe-
cifically, Professor McGovern offered four proposals: "(1) revise the MDL rule or 
approach to make the strategy explicit; (2) revise Rule 23 to allow for more com-
prehensive settlements; (3) provide institutional support for state judges and for 
cooperative efforts; and (4) revise the Manual for Complex Litigation to educate 
judges concerning cooperative institutional strategy." [d. at 1892. 
HeinOnline -- 71 Miss. L.J. 31 2001-2002
2001] THE NEVER-ENDING ASBESTOS CRISIS 31 
horizontal equity in the adjudication. "136 Cooperation on a 
global level will serve two immediate goals-"eliminating re-
dundancy and promoting consistency."137 Additionally, cooper-
ation today would assure the long-term goal of compensating 
claimants who become truly sick in the future. 
A. Take Steps to Control Claims by the Unimpaired 
Courts must be willing to distinguish between the claims of 
those who are truly sick and those who are not. The adoption of 
inactive dockets by courts in Illinois, Massachusetts and Mary-
land is a good example of a method of controlling claims by the 
unimpaired. The unwillingness of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to recognize a cause of action by claimants who are 
asymptomatic is another. Until courts take steps to control 
claims by the unimpaired, court dockets will continue to be 
clogged by such claims, and the limited resources available to 
those who are truly sick will continue to be depleted. 
B. Strictly Enforce Joinder and Venue Rules to 
Prevent Forum Shopping 
Courts need to be more assertive in requiring that claim-
ants have had some substantive contact with the state in which 
they have filed suit. Thousands of cases are filed in states like 
Mississippi even though the claimants have no connection to 
the state because Mississippi's joinder rules are so liberal. 
Similarly, the streamlining of judicial procedures encourages 
out-of-state residents to file suit in Ohio. One solution would be 
for courts to require that plaintiffs either have been exposed to 
asbestos in the state or live or work in the state in which they 
file suit. Doing so would decrease forum shopping while also 
unclogging state courts faced with lawsuits by thousands of 
individuals who literally have no relationship to that state. In-
state plaintiffs who pay taxes to keep the state courthouses 
open would benefit by having their claims heard faster. 
130 [d. at 1867. 
137 [d. at 1872. 
HeinOnline -- 71 Miss. L.J. 32 2001-2002
32 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 71 
C. Bring More Cases Before Fewer Judges 
Many states have procedures which allow for the consolida-
tion of cases from across that state to be transferred to a single 
judge. These types of procedures have been used by states in 
other mass tort contexts such as FenlPhen and silicone breast 
implants. 13s A more consistent approach to the handling of 
the asbestos litigation can be achieved if the number of judges 
responsible for managing asbestos cases is reduced. 139 
D. Provide Institutional Support 
More formal mechanisms should be adopted to provide 
opportunities for judges from across the country to share their 
views and experiences concerning the asbestos litigation. Orga-
nizations such as the National Judicial College and ad hoc 
state court committees have provided forums for improved 
communication in the past, but additional steps should be tak-
en. An organization that maintained claimant statistics, com-
piled case management orders and opinions and provided a 
forum for increased communication would provide judges with 
an important resource to draw upon as they try to balance 
their need to move cases along with the need to protect both 
the availability of funds to compensate the truly sick and the 
rights of defendants. 14o Making this information available to 
litigants may also streamline the parties' ability to work out 
138 Id. at 1886-87. 
13' One solution of course would be to revise the multi-district litigation (MDL) 
rules to allow both state and federal claims to be transferred to a single judge. 
As Professor McGovern explains, "[iJf the MDL statute were amended to allow the 
transferee judge to oversee pretrial discovery for both federal and state cases, it 
would be possible to reduce much of the redundant discovery." Id. at 1892. Addi-
tionally, if the MDL judge had greater powers, such as the ability to defer aggre-
gation or settlement until the marketplace has spoken, or to eliminate incentives 
to file claims prematurely (e.g., toll the statute of limitations), "then the prema-
ture massness that preempts a liability determination could be lessened." Id. 
140 Professor McGovern conceptualizes a National Center for State Courts, 
funded by the State Justice Institute, which would establish an "institutional 
mechanism . . . to share information and provide limited support" so that there 
would be "a permanent method of insuring a more effective state marketplace of 
litigation." Id. at 1894. 
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case management and discovery matters with less court m-
volvement. 
E. Use the Tools that Already Exist 
While some common-sense innovations, such as inactive 
dockets, are available to the courts, many judges do not have to 
look past their own court rules to improve the asbestos prob-
lem. One of the reasons that more and more asbestos claims 
are being filed is that courts have been unwilling to treat as-
bestos claims like they would other tort claims. Judges need to 
require plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof and be willing 
to dismiss cases on summary judgment if that burden is not 
met. Furthermore, judges need to enforce the procedural rights 
of defendants and, in particular, the rights of defendants to full 
discovery. The time required to enforce the rule of law now will 
actually save time in the future because the incentive to file 
frivolous or marginal claims will have been eliminated. 
IV. THE COURTS ARE THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION 
In Ortiz u. Fibreboard Corp.,l4l United States Supreme 
Court Justice David Souter stated that "the elephantine mass 
of asbestos cases ... defies customary judicial administra-
tion."142 As one Third Circuit Judge commented: 
Unquestionably, a national solution is needed. Despite 
the deteriorating situation, Congress has declined to act and 
class actions are inadequate remedy .... 
. . . Courts should no longer wait for congressional or 
legislative action to correct common law errors made by the 
courts themselves. Mistakes created by courts can be correct-
ed by courts without engaging in judicial activism. It is judi-
cial paralysis, not activism, that is the problem in this ar-
ea. 143 
J4I 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
HZ Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 628-29 (1997) ("The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administra-
tive claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient 
means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not 
adopted such a solution.") (footnote omitted). 
'43 Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1399 (3d Cir.) (Weis, J., dissenting) (footnote 
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Even more recently, in discussing the need for a legislative 
solution, one Maryland District Court Judge recognized: 
the need for developing less complex and more responsive and 
responsible ways of sorting out the blame and cost for indus-
trial-age ills such as asbestosis than a system of litigation 
meant to sort out competing claims to straying cattle. Yet, the 
system lumbers on because no one has the incentive or initia-
tive to change it, perhaps because everyone is so invested in 
the status quo. 144 
The need for a national solution has never been stronger 
than it is today, where over thirty companies have been forced 
into bankruptcy as a result of asbestos-related litigation, where 
the number of cases on court dockets continues to grow at epi-
demic proportions and where claimants who get sick in the 
future run the risk of undercompensation or no compensation 
at all. However, without federal legislation, which remains 
speculative, only the courts can take steps to improve the as-
bestos litigation environment. Mechanisms designed to move 
cases along have failed. Courts must be willing to try new tech-
niques, such as inactive dockets, and at the same time enforce 
those rules-tort standards and forum limitations-that al-
ready exist. Whichever path they choose, the courts must do 
something now before the problem gets even worse. 
omitted), modified on other grounds, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993). 
,« Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 133 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
751 (D. Md. 2001). 
